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Introduction 
 
On 18 March 2014, approximately 300 students stormed the Legislative Yuan in 
Taipei, and began occupying the building. This was done in response to legislators 
from the ruling Chinese Nationalist Party (Kuomintang, KMT) expediting the review 
process of the controversial Cross-Strait Services Trade Agreement (CCSTA) with 
the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Many Taiwanese feared that the CSSTA, a 
follow up to the Economic Co-operation Framework Agreement (ECFA) signed in 
2010, might be detrimental to Taiwan’s economy and sovereignty. In the days after 
the occupation of the Legislative Yuan, more than 10,000 Taiwanese surrounded 
the Yuan building in support of the students. These demonstrations were followed 
by student-led protests in other Taiwanese cities against the CSSTA. A remarkable 
characteristic of these protests was the frequent reference that protestors made to 
Hong Kong. The Special Administrative Region was depicted as a victim of 
economic integration with Beijing.  Delegations from the student movements in 
Hong Kong paid visits to the occupying students and organised a rally in Hong 
Kong in support. It was the first time that people in Hong Kong and Taiwan had 
expressed their solidarity and strong mutual support so vocally.  
   The economic integration of Taiwan and China has accelerated since the KMT 
regained power in 2008 under President Ma Ying-jeou. During this period, 
Taiwan’s semi-official Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) has signed several 
agreements with their Beijing counterpart, the Association for Relations across the 
Taiwan Straits (ARATS). These included an agreement concerning the ‘Three 
Direct Links’ (flights, shipping and post), the ECFA, and ten follow-up agreements. 
This pattern of economic integration follows that of the Closer Economic 
Partnership Arrangement (CEPA) signed between Mainland China and Hong Kong 
in 2003. Both the Taiwan ECFA and the Hong Kong CEPA frameworks provide 
preferred access to the Chinese market for Hong Kongese and Taiwanese 
                                                 
1
 An earlier draft of this paper was presented at the Tenth Annual Conference of the 
European Association of Taiwan Studies in Lyon, May 2013 and in November 2013 as part 
of the Taiwan in Comparative Perspective seminar series at the London School of 
Economics organised by Dr Shih Fang-long. The author wishes to thank conference and 
seminar participants for their constructive feedback and Ms Heidi NK Wang for her valuable 
comments and help.  
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companies respectively, and allow individual Chinese tourists to visit both 
territories. 
   However, there has been increasing concern among the Taiwanese that 
integration with China is transforming Taiwan, and questions have been raised as 
to whether it is becoming the next Hong Kong. In recent years, the issue of the 
‘Hongkongisation’ ( !") of Taiwan, framed as following the path of Hong Kong’s 
post-1997 development, has gained significant public attention and has been 
widely discussed in the media; media outlets in sympathy with pro-independence 
organisations and the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), such as the Liberty 
Times Group, have raised the spectre of the Hongkongisation of Taiwan since as 
early as 2001 (Liu 2001). The KMT administration has continued to deepen its 
relations with Mainland China, with the result that debate over increasingly 
negative similarities between Taiwan and Hong Kong has intensified during Ma 
Ying-jeou’s second term. Issues that have been debated have included economic 
dependence on Mainland China, as well as a pro-China media bias, and these 
have been perceived by some to be indicators and features of Hongkongisation. 
The debate has been further fuelled by concerns over the increasingly dominant 
position of the pro-China Want Want China Times Group in the media sector. This 
concern increased after the Group emerged as one of the investors taking over the 
Next Media Group (Taiwan), including Apple Daily, the largest newspaper on the 
island. 
   Although there are scholarly attempts to define what ‘Hongkongisation’ means, 
the discussion remains largely descriptive and unsystematic and the Taiwanese 
media continues to employ the concept without a fundamental assessment of its 
appropriateness and limitations. This paper goes beyond current research and 
journalistic practices to develop a deeper understanding of the concept, through a 
critical investigation of the relationship between Hong Kong and Taiwan and by 
comparing Taiwan’s and Hong Kong’s relationship vis-à-vis Mainland China. The 
paper begins with an outline of previously-dominant discourses in Taiwan on Hong 
Kong, following which the concept of Hongkongisation is de-constructed and re-
conceptualised by considering the argument for comparing Taiwan’s and Hong 
Kong’s relationship with the PRC (in the case of Hong Kong, focusing particularly 
on the post-1997 period). Next, convergence theory is introduced as a theoretical 
framework, and the current discussion of Hongkongisation is critiqued through 
evidence from interviews with Taiwanese party officials and social activists. The 
concluding remarks put forward suggestions for a balanced perspective on 
Hongkongisation. 
 
‘One Country, Two Systems’ Challenged by Hongkongisation 
 
The PRC does not officially recognise the Republic of China on Taiwan; instead, it 
considers it as a renegade Chinese province. From a historical perspective, the 
post-Mao era saw a significant shift in Chinese Communist Party (CCP) policy 
towards Taiwan, emphasising ‘peaceful reunification’ over ‘liberation’ by force. This 
was accompanied by the formula ‘One Country, Two Systems’, devised by Deng 
Xiaoping in 1983 (Cooney 1997, 500–502). This model was used during the Sino-
British negotiations over the Hong Kong’s sovereignty change and implemented 
after 1997. Hence discussions of Hong Kong in Taiwan were initially and mainly 
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focused on the feasibility of the so-called ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model in 
Hong Kong. The current official PRC position on ‘One Country, Two Systems’ as it 
applies to Taiwan appears in the State Council's 1993 White Paper on ‘The 
Taiwan Question and the Reunification of China’ (Taiwan Affairs Office 1993). The 
four key principles set out in the White Paper can be distinguished into a ‘One 
Country’ part, which includes the strict adherence to the ‘One China’ principle , and 
the promise of a continuation of Taiwan’s current socio-economic system, way of 
life, and economic and cultural ties with foreign countries after ‘reunification’ under 
the ‘Two Systems’ element. Taiwan would become special administrative region 
(SAR) with a ‘high degree of autonomy’, and it is emphasised that economic and 
other links with Mainland China should be rapidly expanded, with negotiations 
towards peaceful reunification commenced as soon as possible. ‘One Country, 
Two Systems’ continues to be the PRC’s formula vis-à-vis Taiwan despite 
Taiwan’s democratisation and the Chen Shui-bian era (Hughes 2001). Yet the 
argument that such a system would ‘radically reduce the degree of autonomy and 
accountability which currently exists in the Taiwanese political system’ (Cooney 
1997: 500) has made it largely unacceptable for Taiwan’s political actors and 
population. Indeed, public opinion surveys routinely indicate an overall rejection of 
the formula: in 2007, only 12.8 percent found it acceptable, with 72.2 percent 
responding negatively (Shaw 2009). The negative experience of Hong Kong with 
the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model did deepen the adverse view of the model 
in Taiwan. 
   Hong Kong’s post-1997 development has been used by the DPP in political 
campaigns to emphasise the value of Taiwan’s sovereignty and the dangers of 
close economic integration with China. In DPP discourse, the ‘One Country, Two 
Systems’ model is a proven failure in Hong Kong and will be a disaster for Taiwan. 
In summer 2010, prior to the municipal elections and after the signing of ECFA, the 
DPP produced a short video to illustrate this. It was narrated entirely in Cantonese, 
and thus conveyed a sense of authenticity of a local Hong Kong perspective: the 
usage of Cantonese is a rare practice in Taiwan’s electioneering, and it creates a 
strong connection between Hong Kong and Taiwan, as it implies that Hong Kong 
today could be Taiwan tomorrow. Post-CEPA Hong Kong was portrayed as dark 
place, in which the rich were getting richer and the poor were getting poorer. The 
message was that when the ECFA comes into effect, Taiwan will similarly 
experience increasing inequality. The reference to Hong Kong in the video 
indicates that the political elites in Taiwan are observing closely changes in Hong 
Kong, and consciously comparing these two special political entities. This is further 
exemplified by frequent reference to Hong Kong by Taiwan media outlets critical of 
the PRC government, or which support the opposition and pro-independence 
perspectives. Hong Kong is employed as an example of the negative outcome of 
the current administration’s pro-integration policies. 
   This paper provides an alternative discourse of Hongkongisation, salient and 
relevant to Taiwan’s politics and society. It therefore goes beyond existing 
arguments and a discussion of the ‘One Country, Two Systems’ model. That 
model has been subject to a very comprehensive debate, and its formula has been 
predominantly rejected in Taiwan; another analysis focusing solely on the same 
model would only reinforce the hegemonic structure of the debate, in which the 
PRC ‘grants’ Taiwan the status of an SAR. It would also provide a further 
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opportunity for the CCP to manipulate Taiwan and Hong Kong, and ignore political 
opportunities for Taiwan and Hong Kong to resist. Conversely, a balanced and fair 
argument would assume that all actors – the CCP, Hong Kong and Taiwan – 
possess a certain degree of agency, and this is the key to a thorough 
understanding of the term ‘Hongkongisation’. 
 
Hong Kong and Taiwan in Comparative Perspective 
 
Hong Kong figures in the political thought and policy of political elites as well as of 
the media in Taiwan, making a comparison between the two locations’ respective 
relationships with Mainland China critical. Currently, ‘Hongkongisation’ as used in 
the media lacks sufficient depth and understanding, due to a lack of clear definition 
and appropriate analytical framework: meaningful comparison between Hong Kong 
and Taiwan is largely absent in scholarly literature and media analyses, and 
Hongkongisation is treated as if it were a surprisingly new phenomenon. 
Therefore, before defining Hongkongisation, this paper will first establish the 
rationale and justification for comparative research on Hong Kong and Taiwan. 
   Hong Kong and Taiwan share a number of comparable social, economic, cultural 
and political elements. While there is a fundamental difference in the level of 
sovereignty, there is a general consensus within the research community that both 
societies are in ethno-cultural terms predominantly Chinese societies. The majority 
of the populations are ethnic Han Chinese, and rituals of ancestral worship, 
religious festivals and traditions prevail in the living culture of both societies. These 
features are considered to be defining characteristics of Chinese values and 
identity (Weller 2007: 342). In Taiwan and Hong Kong, religious rituals and 
traditions were not affected by the campaigns of the Communist regime of China. 
The same holds true for cultural values and philosophies such as Confucianism. In 
Taiwan, the KMT actively promoted traditional Chinese culture in the 1960s while, 
in Hong Kong, the British colonial rulers did not interfere in the cultural and 
religious affairs of their subjects. Chinese history and language were taught in 
schools in both societies. Therefore both societies favour very similar ‘Chinese 
core cultural values’ (Yang 1986). Among the foremost is the Confucian idea of 
filial piety, which continues to shape social organisations and interpersonal 
interaction in Hong Kong and Taiwan (Yeh 2003).  
   Another crucial factor is shared experience: the decades of colonial rule in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan (by the British and the Japanese respectively), economic 
success in the 1970s, and democratisation in the 1980s (So and May 1993; Yu 
2004). This shared experience has led to a set of similar social structures, political 
institutions to accommodate democratic development, and a rising civic 
awareness. Hong Kong and Taiwan both tasted modernity and progress as 
introduced by their colonisers. Also, the colonial history experienced by the two 
societies has created a strong identification with values associated with modernity, 
as well as recognition of the need to preserve tradition. Most importantly, the two 
cases refute the claim that Confucian countries are not compatible with 
democracy. 
   A further basis for comparison is the presence of a ‘common opponent’. Both 
entities face the challenge of Chinese nationalism and its related policies, known 
as the ‘China factor’. Bhattacharya (2005), for instance, envisions a clash between 
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the state nationalism of the PRC and the civic Hong Kong identity. By contesting 
Chinese state nationalism, Hong Kong contests the CCP’s legitimacy. The 
proclaimed unity of nation-state-party advocated by Beijing is also undermined by 
alternative ideas of Chineseness not only in Hong Kong, but also in Taiwan. 
Analytically, therefore, two factors determine the position of the Beijing regime in 
relation to Taiwan and Hong Kong. Firstly, there is the emerging nationalism 
discourses of the 1990s, particularly the narrative of colonial humiliation, that 
explain the great symbolic importance of the ‘handovers’ of Hong Kong in 1997 
and Macau in 1999. Taiwan’s de facto status is in this way framed by Beijing as a 
consequence of foreign intervention in the region, especially by the US, and thus 
as evidence of imperialism against the Chinese people (Brown 2004: 21). 
Secondly, there is the ethno-cultural understanding of Chinese identity which forms 
the basis of PRC discourse and is evident in the PRC White Papers on Taiwan 
and in the rhetoric of the Beijing leadership in relation with Hong Kong. Beijing’s 
purpose is to roll back democratic progress and penetrate both societies with its 
influence. The PRC regime employs the discourse of national identity to engender 
a dichotomy between Western and Chinese values. This ‘either democracy or 
Chinese political values’ mentality enables the regime to brand democrats in Hong 
Kong and Taiwan as traitors in collusion with foreigners against the ‘authentic’ 
Chinese (Wu 2007). Thus, through the lens of the Communist Party, shared civic 
awareness in Taiwan and Hong Kong is portrayed as threatening and unpatriotic. 
   The experience of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (HKSAR) has 
implications for Taiwan simply because the Communist regime in Beijing is using 
Hong Kong as a laboratory to experiment with policies and government formula 
prior to applying these to Taiwan. The Chinese government is learning from its 
experience in Hong Kong and, as a consequence, the post-1997 experience of 
Hong Kong is of crucial importance for the analysis of Taiwan and its future. Hong 
Kong’s path to further democratisation over the past decade has been described 
as retroactive (Sing 2004; Ma 2007; Chan 2008). While Taiwan’s democracy has 
been further consolidated during the Chen Shui-bian era and with the second 
change of power in 2008, China has been allowed to exert its influence more and 
more directly and forcefully in Hong Kong, which, for example, effectively halted 
moves towards meaningful universal suffrage. (. This process is crystallised in the 
term used by Sonny Lo: ‘Mainlandisation’. Lo observes that this term had been 
used by Hong Kong analysts and politicians to refer to ‘the political and legal 
processes in which the HKSAR has demonstrated the practises of mainland China’ 
(S.S.-H. Lo 2008: 42). Cases in which politics was perceived to interfere with the 
rule of law were already being cited shortly after the handover. However, Hong 
Kong politicians and scholars have not provided a comprehensive 
conceptualisation of the process. The discussion is usually confined to individual 
cases, and examples of ‘Mainlandisation’ are provided with reference to the civil 
service, the media and the protection of civil liberties. Lo removes the negative 
connotation from the definition, stating merely that the purpose of Mainlandisation 
is to activate ‘Hong Kong’s swift convergence with the motherland in multi-faceted 
aspects’ (43). He thus neutralises the term, which, in actuality, refers to an active 
policy of the HKSA government to be ‘politically’ more dependent on and similar to 
Beijing, economically more reliant on the Mainland’s support, socially more 
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patriotic toward the motherland, and legally more reliant on the interpretation of the 
Basic Law by the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress’ (42–43). 
   Lo reconceptualises the term ‘Mainlandisation’ through the lens of convergence 
theory. This systemises the often anecdotal evidence about the Taiwan–China 
relationship and the phenomenon of so-called Hongkongisation into a more 
analytical framework, and is used by Lo to interpret Hong Kong’s development 
under its first Chief Executive, Tung Chee-hwa. 
   Convergence theory is based on the ideas of a Dutch economist, Jan Tinbergen, 
as explained in his seminal 1961 article ‘Do Communists and Free Economies 
Show Converging Patterns?’ Tinbergen observed that Western capitalist 
economies appeared to be moving towards a social democratic-oriented welfare 
state model at the same time that Eastern European economies were leaving 
behind their Stalinist legacies and beginning to liberalise economically and 
politically. As a consequence, the two types of economies were becoming not only 
increasingly akin, but were also beginning to influence each other (Tinbergen 
1961: 332) and to show signs of convergence in the areas of bureaucratisation, 
social welfare guarantees and pricing (338). Both systems were being altered 
beyond recognition. 
   Brockmann (1997) provides the context for the growing popularity of 
convergence theory. He notes that it was well received during the 1960s when the 
post-war economic boom in the West was at its height, and Communist economies 
were attempting to address the failures of the command economy through cautious 
liberalisation. Subsequently, ‘convergence theory... spread beyond the relatively 
narrow realm of economic theory to become part of broader cultural debate about 
post-war industrial society’ (59). The essential premise was that industrial societies 
in the West and countries in the Soviet realm would both make socio-economic 
progress and become alike. This thesis appeared to be validated with the collapse 
of the Soviet empire and the spread of capitalism and democracy through Eastern 
Europe.  
Applying Western theory to the case of Hong Kong, it seems that the process of 
convergence is largely one-way, from China to Hong Kong and not vice versa. It is 
true there had initially been hopes that democrats would be able to influence a 
reforming China, thus effecting a convergence towards the Western model of 
democracy; Peter Cheung (2011) does indeed observe the selective adaptation of 
Hong Kong practices, experiences and values, especially in Southern China. 
These have been mostly limited to business practises and some bureaucratic 
structures. Interesting instances are the adaptation of limited protests practices 
that have diffused among the younger generation from Hong Kong to China. Yet it 
seems premature to speak of political convergence, with China adopting more 
liberal values and practices, and the process remains very much dependent on a 
further liberalisation and democratisation of the PRC. Therefore, for the time being 
the Hong Kong case presents a one-way flow of the convergence process, and the 
predominant influence is that of Beijing on Hong Kong. Thus Lo’s earlier verdict – 
identifying no signs of political convergence between the PRC’s authoritarian 
system and Hong Kong’s semi-democratic, semi-competitive system, and instead 
observing a dilution of the territory’s political and economic uniqueness – remains 
valid for the time being (S.S.-H. Lo 2008: 41–42). This one-sidedness of 
convergence, and the dilution of Hong Kong’s pre-1997 civil liberties and 
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freedoms, are not only results of the HKSAR government policy but also a direct 
consequence of the strategies employed by the Beijing regime vis-à-vis the 
democratic societies in the so-called Greater China region. 
   The lopsided nature of the convergence process in Hong Kong can be explained 
by the strategic dimension of the Communist regime, which is exaggerated by the 
media but overlooked by academia. Mainlandisation is not merely a descriptive 
concept, but also a strategic one, encompassing a number of facets. It includes 
putting political pressure on the media, civil society groups and the judicial 
community to adhere to positions promoted by Beijing. At the same time, the direct 
involvement of the Liaison Office in local politics enables the CCP to monitor social 
development on a micro-scale. In addition, the rise in importance of Mainland 
businesses has become a part of the government–business collusion in Hong 
Kong, leading to increasingly blatant political interference in local business and 
competition in favour of pro-Mainland Chinese companies and the weakening of 
the anti-corruption bodies. This makes the situation akin to that in Mainland China, 
and it also has the potential to re-write the rule of law, a key part of the Hong Kong 
identity. At a mundane level, the everyday life of Hong Kong people is altered 
through the influx of Mainland tourists and immigrants, and the growing usage of 
simplified Chinese characters and Mandarin Chinese in the public realm. It would 
be unfair to argue that the entire phenomenon is strategically planned in detail by 
the Communist Party with the goal of fully assimilating Hong Kong. However, it 
would be equally naïve to overlook the strategic aspects of Beijing’s actions, 
steering the political development of Hong Kong away from further democratisation 
and, indeed, the Western model of democracy in its entirety. The following section 
defines Hongkongisation, and facilitates a better understanding of the strategic 
aspect of convergence. 
 
Framing Hongkongisation 
 
Following the opening of the border with China in the late 1970s, and with the 
beginning of Sino-British consultations over the future of the territory in the 1980s, 
the Beijing leadership managed to identify and convert new allies and co-opt them 
into their united front scheme.2 The main target were Hong Kong elites such as the 
business community, industrialists, and real estate conglomerates, as well as 
former British appointees to consultative bodies set up by the colonial 
administration (Wong 1997). As a consequence, pro-Beijing social and economic 
elites became dominant in the city from the 1990s, while the lack of accountability 
in consultative committees has hampered the performance legitimacy of the 
administration. This has been further exacerbated by the continuous patronage in 
post-1997 administrations of ‘patriotic’ and pro-business forces (Fong 2014). 
Beijing’s united front work furthermore relies on traditional leftist groups, such as 
pro-Beijing unions and a wide array of associations ranging from hometown to 
women’s groups. If politically necessary – e.g. during elections or government 
consultation exercises – these groups could be easily mobilised in support of pro-
government forces or government policies (Kaeding 2010). 
                                                 
2
 Research has shown that the Beijing government has for decades made extensive use of 
united front organisations in Hong Kong (Wong 1997; S.H. Lo 2001). 
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   This strategic co-option under a united front scheme is taking place in Taiwan, in 
a similar fashion as seen in Hong Kong. Capitalists who rely on the Mainland 
market or production, and who favour intimate relations with the Chinese regime, 
have been targeted directly since Taiwan’s democratisation and the early 
improvements in Cross-Strait relations. This strategy was intensified with the onset 
of the Chen Shui-bian era (Hughes 2001). Since at least the beginning of intensive 
face-to-face exchanges under Ma Ying-jeou, a broader spectrum of societal 
groups and leaders has been identified by the Communist Party as possible 
agents in a united front strategy. Yet there remains one fundamental difference 
between Hong Kong and Taiwan – the degree of sovereignty. In Hong Kong, 
political intervention by Beijing after 1997 has been overt, and increasingly so after 
2003, accelerating particularly during the Tsang era. This political intervention has 
come via either the direct involvement of staff and associates of the Joint Liaison 
Office in Sheung Wan, through Basic Law interpretations of the NPC’s Standing 
Committee, or through comments by Mainland law professors and constitutional 
experts or statements by the Beijing leadership. Where Taiwan is concerned, 
however, it is hard to imagine that comments by the Beijing leadership will have 
the desired outcome on the island. Nevertheless the possible establishment of a 
Joint Liaison Office in Taipei might allow the PRC to concentrate and organise its 
undercover activities on the island, and establish links with united front actors and 
agents coming to Taiwan through individual visitor schemes and student 
exchanges. 
   As with Mainlandisation, the concept of Hongkongisation remains a largely fuzzy 
concept. However, four dimensions can be identified. Wu Jieh-min recognises 
three areas of direct influence on Taiwan, or ‘Mainlandisation’: economic, media, 
and political discourse, and I argue that united front strategies can be added to 
Wu’s framework to give a more complete conceptualisation. The economic realm 
is a frontier that encompasses trade and business relations: in this, united front 
agents can be business tycoons and tourists from Mainland China. And, as 
mentioned earlier, the ECFA between Taiwan and the PRC has been likened to 
the CEPA between China and Hong Kong. The Taiwan economy’s growing 
dependency on the Chinese market might lead to limitations in the government’s 
manoeuvring space, as the Beijing regime could use the economy as leverage vis-
à-vis Taipei. The 2012 Presidential election is evidence of the growing clout of pro-
Chinese business interests, in which key business figures, such as HTC chair Cher 
Wang, went beyond general endorsements of an administration or candidate, to 
urge the public to back the KMT’s China policy and accept the ‘1992 consensus’. 
Meanwhile, Chinese tourists form the largest group of overseas tourists in Taiwan. 
Since July 2008, more than 4.83 million Mainland tourists have visited the island. 
This illustrates clear parallels with the situation in Hong Kong, where the 
government has transformed the territory into a prime destination for Mainland 
visitors, and the SAR has come to rely heavily on tourism from Mainland China 
after the individual travellers’ scheme was implemented in 2003. Within a single 
decade, the cumulative number of Mainland visitors under the scheme had 
surpassed 100 million (Chong et al. 2013). 
   Beijing’s second strategy is to interfere with media freedom in Taiwan, as in 
Hong Kong. With the assistance of pro-business groups, the media are increasing 
manipulated by a de facto alliance of the KMT and the CCP with regard to 
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reporting on China. Changes in the ownership structure of the Taiwan media have 
given rise to self-censorship (Wu 2012), which has gained greater public attention 
after the moderate conservative China Times was purchased by Want Want 
Holdings. This company is led by a pro-Beijing businessman, and it consequently 
adopted a staunchly pro-China editorial stance. The issue of media freedom has 
been extensively debated in Hong Kong, as China has exerted influence on 
journalists’ reports and analysis. Freedom of expression and of the press have 
deteriorated since the transition period, largely as the consequence of journalists’ 
self-censorship (Zhang 2006) and the change of media ownership (Fung 2007). 
The recent firing and life-threatening attack on a famous Ming Pao editor, well-
known for his critical stance vis-à-vis the HKSAR and Beijing governments, has 
raised fears of China’s more direct involvement (Mullany 2014). 
   However, the model of Mainlandisation provided by Wu underestimates the 
breadth and strength of the united front work on the societal level. It overlooks, for 
example, the efforts of Beijing to co-opt Taiwan university students. Interviews with 
Taiwanese student activists and political party strategists confirm that the CCP 
approach to winning the hearts and minds of the Taiwanese has moved already 
beyond the business sector and direct material benefits: politically active students 
and student union members are targeted by united front agents, and invited onto 
organised trips to Mainland China promising prestige but also taking advantage of 
curiosity about China. In co-opting either naïve or politically convinced student 
leaders, united front institutions are able to gain access to other Taiwanese 
students; they also benefit from the legitimacy of the student organisations. This 
model has been tested and effectively put in place in Hong Kong for a long time, 
hence illustrating another area in which Taiwan is being Hongkongised. 
   Wu’s analysis of the political dimension as the third element of Hongkongisation 
is also instructive. In this, he identifies both discursive hegemony and the hands-on 
micromanagement of local politics. The discursive area of Cross-Strait relations 
and elections is dominated by the so-called ‘1992 consensus’ of ‘One China, 
different interpretations’ and, through this, Beijing has increasingly been involved 
with, and even participated in, the manipulation of Taiwan’s (national) elections. 
Such involvement was evident in Taiwan’s 2012 Presidential elections (van der 
Wess 2012). In relation to Hong Kong, scholars have pointed out that the financial 
balance is clearly tilted in favour of pro-Beijing candidates (S.H. Lo 2001; Ma 
2008), so that the ‘1992 consensus’ has become a mainstream and unchallenged 
discourse during campaigning. Pro-Beijing parties have been able to use their 
extensive grassroots network of leftist and patriotic organisations in election 
campaigns; more importantly, there also is a mismatch between the vast financial 
and logistic resources deployed and the official election expenses of individual 
candidates, even when grassroots organisations providing volunteers and direct 
assistance are taken into account. Scholars have pointed out that the financial 
balance is clearly tilted in favour of pro-Beijing candidates (S.H. Lo 2001; Ma 
2008). The isolation or shunning of pan-democrats in Hong Kong and pan-green 
parties in Taiwan by mainstream media outlets and the China-friendly business 
sector is thus part of the CCP’s election strategy. However, it is a key feature of 
these strategies that they are carried out underground. Moreover, the influence of 
Taiwanese and Hong Kong businessmen working on the Mainland and with 
Mainland counterparts is likely to grow further, given the accelerated pace of 
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economic integration. Figure 1 below shows the four dimensions that provide a 
comprehension framework of Hongkongisation, as viewed through the lens of the 
united front scheme of the Chinese Communist Party. It demonstrates Beijing’s 
strategy of assimilating Taiwan, in a similar manner to Hong Kong. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: Four dimensions of Hongkongisation as part 
of united front strategy 
 
The Role of Agency 
 
Beijing’s attempts at Hongkongisation overlook the agency of Taiwan and Hong 
Kong, including the flipside of Taiwan’s Hongkongisation. In this, the island has 
experienced a different kind of Hongkongisation which includes the rise of civil 
resistance against too-rapid integration with China. Taiwanese civil society 
organisations and social movement actors follow closely the analysis and 
arguments made in Hong Kong, as well as the patterns of protests employed by 
the Special Administrative Region. In any case, the convergence between Hong 
Kong and Taiwan is different from the process involving Hong Kong and Mainland 
China. The former is two-directional, whereas the latter is largely one-directional. 
Wu observes that Taiwan increasingly resembles Hong Kong, but there is 
evidence that Hong Kong is also increasingly converging with Taiwan, as Hong 
Kong learns from Taiwan. The increasing sophistication of civil society actors, 
social movements and, most importantly, political parties with regard to 
mobilisation and election campaign strategies and styles that has been seen in 
Hong Kong in recent years is inspired by Taiwan. A number of political parties 
have adopted more confrontational and elaborate styles of political campaigning, 
modelled after Taiwan politics (Kaeding 2010). Furthermore, the rise of identity 
politics in Hong Kong parallels that in Taiwan.  
CCP 
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   The question as to whether Taiwan will increasingly bend to Beijing’s pressure 
and become increasingly like Mainland China is more difficult to answer. On the 
one hand, the island remains a democratic, vibrant country and, unlike Hong Kong, 
it has the means to defend its sovereignty. On the other hand, the rising influence 
of business interests in politics, and the non-transparent nature of negotiations 
over trade pacts with China, point towards Mainlandisation. There is also the 
question as to whether, like Hong Kong, the process of convergence or 
Hongkongisation applies equally in all areas actively fostered by the government 
and the political elites. In some key areas such as tourism, economic relations and 
cultural exchanges, this is clearly the case. However, it is difficult to argue that 
KMT government elites are consciously aiming at turning Taiwan into a version of 
post-1997 Hong Kong or of the Chinese Mainland. Such an outcome is more likely 
to be due to miscalculation on the part of the Taiwanese government, caused by 
naivety: the government might simply underestimate or misinterpret aspects of co-
operation with China. This seems to be a possibility in the cultural sector, as a 
telling incident illustrates: at an overseas public forum, the KMT’s new Minister of 
Culture, Lung Ying-tai, a well-known writer and academic, appeared to be oblivious 
to the fact that Chinese cultural productions from mainland China were based on a 
Chinese culture selectively created by the CCP, and containing ideological 
elements.3 In this regard, the DPP appears at least superficially better prepared, 
as it seems to be more critical of advances by the CCP with respect to co-
operation between Taiwan and the PRC.  
   Finally, it must be admitted that the terms Hongkongisation or Mainlandisation 
are value-laden and to some degree misleading. These terms suggest a lack of 
agency on the Hong Kong and Taiwan side: Hong Kong is Mainlandised, Taiwan is 
Hongkongised. This discourse ignores the power and agency of Taiwan and Hong 
Kong. It also leads to a hidden empowerment of the CCP, as the terms assume 
the existence of a highly sophisticated Beijing government capable of manipulating 
both Hong Kong and Taiwan. The unstated assumption is that the power of the 
central leadership is so strong that it leaves little room for resistance by either 
Hong Kong or Taiwan. Indeed, the terminology distances Hong Kong from Taiwan, 
resulting in a missed opportunity for co-operation between the two locations. 
However, this co-operation does, in fact, exist, as student leaders and party 
representatives in both societies confirmed during the Legislative Yuan occupation 
through visible and frequent exchanges and expressions of solidarity on social 
media sites such as Facebook and actual visits of Hong Kong delegations to the 
protesting students. Here, convergence theory suggests a two-way communication 
and the fluidity of power. Taiwan can influence Hong Kong, and Hong Kong 
Taiwan. This gives agency to both Taiwan and Hong Kong, and creates the 
possibility for both of them to counter CCP manipulation. 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
3
 Minister Lung publicly stated on 22 March 2013 in a forum held at the School of Oriental 
and African Studies, University of London, that Mainland Chinese television programmes 
would be safely acceptable to Taiwanese audiences and should be readily available.  
TAIWAN IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE  131 
 
The Future of Hongkongisation 
 
This paper re-visits the notions of Mainlandisation and Honkongisation, and 
attempts to conceptualise them. It has identified areas in which there are 
symptoms of Hongkongisation in Taiwan were identified, but also spaces in which 
Taiwan and Hong Kong can resist the surrounding influence of China. Wu Jieh-
min, as well as Wang Dan (a former Chinese student leader and scholar), have 
emphasised the role of civil society in resistance against the reversal of democratic 
progress. Social movements such as student movements in Hong Kong and 
Taiwan co-operate and exchange ideas; illustrative examples include Scholarism 
in Hong Kong, the anti-media hegemony movement in Taiwan and, most recently, 
the occupation of the Legislative Yuan. Furthermore, there is the possibility that – 
at the grassroots level – democratic ideas and values can travel into China via 
student exchanges from Taiwan and Hong Kong.  
   A systematic analysis of Hongkongisation narrows the gap between the 
journalistic usage of this term and the empirical evidence. However, although there 
is a distance between suggested developments in the media and the reality on the 
ground, there is also a wide array of possibilities for resisting PRC pressure. The 
Taiwanese (and Hongkongers) have basically four options in dealing with 
Mainlandisation/Hongkongisation. There is the utilitarian option, which would mean 
making the most economically of the situation, and seizing the possibilities of 
closer integration that exist in the short and medium terms. There is the defeatist 
option, which would mean giving up all resistance and perhaps emigrating 
elsewhere, as many Hong Kong people did in the run-up to 1997. There is the 
radical position, in which Taiwanese would strive for a fundamental break with 
China, as propagated by pro-independence groups in Taiwan and the autonomy 
movement in Hong Kong. The forth option might be more realistic, and would entail 
both co-operation and resistance. In this, Taiwanese need to be well informed and 
aware of developments in Hong Kong civil society groups in both societies, and to 
co-operate to resist PRC policies of integration. However, resistance must be 
based on information and education. The importance of democracy and human 
rights needs to be communicated, together with the idea that these are not 
guaranteed and need continually to be defended. The value of the status quo in 
Hong Kong and Taiwan vis-à-vis China has to be emphasised, together with areas 
where caution needs to be applied in co-operating with China. In short, Hong Kong 
and Taiwan need to know each other, and learn from each other to resist 
Mainlandisation and Hongkongisation. 
   It would appear that, at the moment, a significant part of the population, led by 
student activists in both territories, is opting for the fourth option. This is attested to 
by the close co-operation and mutual support demonstrated among civil society 
groups in Hong Kong and Taiwan at the Occupy Legislative Yuan and in the 
planned Occupy Central movements. This co-operation shows that, while the fear 
of Mainlandisation and Hongkongsation is real, there is recognition that both 
groups – learning from and supporting each other – have the power to effect 
political action. Hongkongisation should therefore not be simply understood as a 
passive phenomenon, but also as a situation that creates an active motion of 
resistance. It would be ironic if the united front strategy of Beijing should create a 
132  MALTE PHILIPP KAEDING 
 
 
vibrant cross-straits civil society fighting for more political participation and 
government oversight. 
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